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Abstract 
We use changes in the value of a firm’s real estate assets as an exogenous change in a firm’s 
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investment conditional on this change, and (ii) firms’ reporting quality responses to the change in 
financing capacity. We find that financing and investment by firms with higher reporting quality 
is less affected by changes in real estate values than are financing and investment by firms with 
lower reporting quality. Further, firms increase reporting quality in response to decreases in 
financing capacity. Our findings contribute to the literature on reporting quality and investment, 
and on the determinants of reporting quality choices. 
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1. Introduction 
How financing capacity affects investment is the subject of a large literature in corporate 
finance (see Hubbard [1998] and Stein [2003] for reviews). More recently, researchers have 
begun to study whether and how reporting quality mitigates under-investment associated with 
financing constraints (e.g., Biddle, Hilary and Verdi [2009]). Despite a growing number of 
papers in this area, little research directly examines whether reporting quality alleviates 
constraints on financing capacity. Therefore, one objective of this paper is to build on recent 
studies on the role of collateral assets in mitigating financing constraints and increasing 
financing capacity. Prior studies show that firms with greater collateral value are able to raise 
more external finance and to invest more (Gan [2007], Benmelech and Bergman [2009], Chaney, 
Sraer and Thesmar [2012]). We extend this literature by predicting that if a firm has higher 
reporting quality, financing and investment will be less sensitive to changes in collateral value. 
Our second objective is to study firms’ reporting quality responses to changes in 
financing capacity. Prior research that examines the impact of reporting quality on investment 
has implicitly assumed that reporting quality is exogenously determined and that a given level of 
reporting quality has implications for future investment. However, it is conceivable that a 
dynamic relation exists such that an increase in the likelihood of under-investment (e.g., an 
decrease in financing capacity) leads to an increase in reporting quality, which ultimately 
facilitates financing and leads to a reduction in (or avoidance of) under-investment. We also test 
this hypothesis. 
We use changes in a firm’s collateral values caused by changes in real estate prices as an 
exogenous change to the financing capacity of a firm. As we discuss below, changes in real 
estate prices are likely to be exogenous to firm-level investment choices, allowing us to attribute 
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our findings to changes in financing capacity. Our identification comes from comparing firms 
that have different levels of real estate assets. When real estate prices change, firms with greater 
levels of real estate experience greater changes in collateral value, which in turn leads to greater 
changes in their financing capacity. Our methodology is akin to a difference-in-difference 
specification that compares changes in financing, investment, and reporting quality activities 
between treatment firms and a benchmark group of firms less affected by changes in real estate 
values.  
Our analysis of the effect of reporting quality on changes in collateral builds on the 
approach of Chaney et al. [2012] who estimate the sensitivity of investment to exogenous 
changes in collateral prices. They find that, over the 1993-2007 period, an increase in real estate 
values that causes an increase of collateral results in significant increases in external financing 
and investment.1 They interpret this result as collateralizable assets mitigating financing 
constraints that are associated with under-investment. We extend this analysis by examining the 
role of reporting quality on the relation between changes in financing and investment, and 
changes in collateral values. We argue that firms with higher reporting quality will suffer fewer 
financing constraints because firms with higher reporting quality will have less information 
asymmetry with external capital providers and thus will be less reliant on collateral. We 
therefore predict that the investment and financing choices of these firms will be less affected by 
changes in collateral values.   
Consistent with this prediction, we find that firms with higher reporting quality have a 
lower sensitivity of investment to collateral changes. For example, while the average firm’s 
sensitivity of investment to real estate prices in our sample equals 2.20 (i.e., approximately two 
                                                 
1 A related study, Gan [2007], finds that a negative change in Japanese real estate values caused significant 
reductions in financing and investment.  
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cents for each dollar of collateral price changes), the sensitivity for a firm with a one standard 
deviation higher value of reporting quality is only 1.58 (a reduction of 28%). We proxy for 
reporting quality by timely loss recognition, the information asymmetry component of the bid-
ask spread, the length of MD&A section of 10K, the number of 8Ks filed, and the number of 
management forecasts. We find similar results with each of these measures individually and with 
an index that combines the measures.  
To shed light on the mechanism behind the investment result, we examine the role of 
reporting quality on the effect of changes in collateral value on financing. The reason that 
changes in collateral value matter for investing is that changes in collateral values affect the 
amount of capital a firm can raise. If the level of collateral falls, lenders may ration credit or 
increase interest rates (Stiglitz and Weiss [1981], Benmelech and Bergman [2009]). Empirically, 
this manifests as a positive association between changes in collateral values and financing 
(Chaney et al. [2012]). We expect reporting quality to mitigate this relation as firms with better 
reporting quality will have less information asymmetry with external capital providers and thus 
will be less reliant on collateral to secure financing. Our results are partially consistent with our 
hypothesis. Consistent with our prediction, firms with low reporting quality issue more debt and 
use this capital to finance investment when the value of collateral goes up. In contrast, firms with 
high reporting quality also issue debt but, instead of using these funds to invest, they return the 
capital to shareholders when the value of collateral goes up. In other words, firms with low 
reporting quality use changes in collateral values to alleviate their financing constraints whereas 
firms with high reporting quality take advantage of collateralized financing to rebalance their 
capital structures. 
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We then examine whether firms respond to the changes in collateral values by changing 
their reporting quality.2 Our findings are consistent with our hypothesis that firms increase 
reporting quality subsequent to decreases in the values of their real estate assets. Specifically, a 
one standard deviation reduction in real estate values is associated with a 6% increase in MD&A 
length, a 5% increase in the frequency of 8K filings, and an 18% increase in the frequency of 
management forecasts. These findings are robust to controlling for firm performance, and to 
controlling for firm and year fixed effects. Overall, these findings show that firms change their 
reporting quality practices in response to changes in financing capacity. 
We perform a series of sensitivity analyses. First, we show that the magnitude of our 
findings is greater for firms more likely to suffer from under-investment (as opposed to over-
investment). Because under-investing firms (as we define below) are also more likely to be 
financially constrained firms, this strengthens the interpretation that reporting quality mitigates 
financing constraints. Second, we examine the source of identification by conducting 
randomization tests. We show that the identification in our paper depends on the magnitude of 
real estate owned by a firm. Third, we show that our results are robust to different ways of 
addressing measurement error issues in our specification as well as selecting sub-samples with 
different types of real estate changes such as good/bad news, excluding the financial crisis, etc. 
Our study contributes to three streams of literature. First, it contributes to research that 
examines the relation between reporting quality and investment. Most of this literature shows 
that reporting quality serves a monitoring role that mitigates moral hazard problems associated 
with over-investment (e.g., Francis and Martin [2010], Hope and Thomas [2008], McNichols and 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper, we use the term “reporting quality” broadly to encompass earnings attributes such as timely 
loss recognition, disclosure practices such as management forecasts and 8K filings, and ex-post measures such as the 
adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.  
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Stubben [2008]). However, there is less research on whether reporting quality serves an 
information role that alleviates financing constraints. Biddle et al. [2009] provide initial evidence 
of this link by showing that, among firms more likely to under-invest, reporting quality is 
positively associated with investment. We extend their paper by using an exogenous change in 
financing capacity in order to study a mechanism linking reporting quality and under-investment. 
Our results are consistent with reporting quality substituting for collateral in mitigating the 
information asymmetry (and accordingly the financing constraints) associated with under-
investment.  
Second, our study also adds to the literature that examines the determinants of disclosure 
policies (e.g., Healy, Hutton and Palepu [1999], Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]). Most of these 
studies examine disclosures around corporate events, such as dividend changes or share 
repurchases (e.g., Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan [2002], Kumar, Sorescu, Boehme and 
Danielsen [2008]), or they examine disclosure choices when firms access capital markets (e.g., 
Lang and Lundholm [2000]). In contrast, we identify changes in financing capacity as an 
exogenous event that changes firms’ investment, financing, and reporting quality decisions.  
Our paper is related to two working papers. Leuz and Schrand [2009] use the fall of 
Enron as a change to the firms’ cost of capital and then study whether changes in disclosure are 
associated with changes in firms’ cost of capital. Frederickson and Hilary [2010] use the 1986 
drop in oil prices as a change in financing constraints and examine how firms with different 
levels of disclosure respond to the change. In contrast to these papers, we use collateral changes 
as proxies for changes in financing capacity that motivate changes in reporting quality. Because 
firms have different amounts of real estate and because real estate price changes are distributed 
over time, we have different treatment and benchmark samples to test our hypotheses. Further, 
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the real estate price changes coupled with different starting collateral values allow us to attribute 
the effects we find to variation in collateral values. Thus, we also contribute to the literature that 
studies the impact of collateral on a firm’s investment and financing decisions (Gan [2007], 
Benmelech and Bergman [2009], and Chaney et al. [2012]).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our research design. Section 4 presents the results; and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses Development 
 In this section, we describe our hypotheses. Our main predictions are (i) that a change in 
collateral value has a greater effect on financing and investment for firms with lower reporting 
quality, and (ii) that firms increase their reporting quality in response to a decrease in collateral 
value.  
Our hypotheses assume that information frictions affect financing and investment. In 
contrast, in the neoclassical framework, a firm’s growth opportunities are the sole driver of 
investment policy (e.g., Yoshikawa [1980], Hayashi [1982], Abel [1983]). Managers obtain 
financing for all positive net present value (NPV) projects, and investment policy is optimal. In 
other words, information frictions do not affect financing and investment because there are no 
differences in information. Outsiders can observe the value of growth options as easily as 
managers can, and thus outsiders finance all positive NPV projects. However, when there is 
information asymmetry between managers and outside suppliers of capital, it affects managers’ 
investment and financing choices.  
Models of adverse selection such as Myers and Majluf [1984] suggest that if managers 
are better informed than investors are about a firm’s prospects, they will time capital issues to 
sell overpriced securities. Alternatively, models of moral hazard show that managers may 
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undertake investments that are not in shareholders’ best interests (Berle and Means [1932], 
Jensen and Meckling [1976]). Suppliers of capital rationally anticipate these information 
frictions and ration capital ex-ante (Myers and Majluf [1984]) and/or increase financing costs 
(Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia [2007]). This reduced financing leads to a reduction in 
investment, as documented by Chaney et al. [2012]. Specifically, given that managers are better 
informed (relative to investors) about a firm’s prospects, capital is rationed, and when firms have 
less financing capacity (due, for example, to collateral changes), they are not as able to raise 
capital and consequently invest less.  
We use changes in real estate prices that change the value of firm real estate assets as 
exogenous changes in the value of collateral. A decrease in collateral value implies a decrease in 
a firm’s financing capacity. Collateralizable assets increase financing capacity by providing a 
source of borrowing with low information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower 
(Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]). Prior research shows that when collateral values fall, so does 
investment and financing, consistent with a reduction in the firms’ financing capacity and hence 
an increase in their financing costs (Gan [2007], Chaney et al. [2012]).  
We build on this literature by predicting that if a firm has lower reporting quality, its 
ability to finance and to invest will be more affected by changes in collateral. This prediction is 
based on two assumptions: (1) information asymmetry drives financing frictions, and (2) 
reporting quality mitigates information asymmetry (Verrecchia [2001]). To see the relation 
between information asymmetry and financing frictions, consider how financing changes as a 
function of information asymmetry. In the limit when there is no information asymmetry, the 
neoclassical model holds, and the firm can finance all its investment opportunities. In this case, 
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collateral values and changes in collateral values have no effect on financing, and therefore no 
effect on investment.  
Once information asymmetry arises, however, changes in collateral value matter because 
they change financing capacity. Consider a reduction in collateral value. The decrease in 
collateral value exacerbates the information asymmetry problem between the firm and financing 
providers. Specifically, the change increases the weighted average information costs associated 
with the firm’s capital (that is, low-asymmetry internal finance declines as a proportion of total 
capital).  For example, less collateral means less security for a loan. In response, lenders increase 
monitoring, increase rates and ration credit (Stiglitz and Weiss, [1981], Benmelech and Bergman 
[2009]). Thus, firms will have lower access to debt financing and may have to look for 
alternative sources of financing such as equity. But also in this case, information asymmetry 
decreases the ability to raise equity and increases financing costs (Myers and Majluf [1984]).  
Our second assumption is that reporting quality mitigates information asymmetry so that 
firms with higher reporting quality have lower financing frictions. Theoretical models of 
disclosure provide support for this assumption (Verrecchia [2001], Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia [2007]). In addition, empirical papers have linked reporting quality to lower costs of 
debt financing (Bharat, Sunder and Sunder [2008], Wittenberg-Moerman [2008]), as well as to 
lower costs of equity financing (Lang and Lundholm [2000], Lee and Masulis [2009]). Further, 
recent research has also documented a negative association between reporting quality and 
investment distortions (e.g., Biddle and Hilary [2006], Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi [2009]).  
In summary, we hypothesize that the effect of a change in collateral values on financing 
and investment will be higher for firms with lower reporting quality. This occurs because 
reporting quality reduces information asymmetry. Thus, when information asymmetry is low 
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(i.e., when reporting quality is high), financing frictions are low and investment approximates the 
neoclassical model in which variations in collateral values will have a limited effect (if any) on 
financing and investment policies. On the other hand, as information asymmetry increases (i.e., 
when reporting quality is lower), financing frictions increase, and investment and financing 
become more sensitive to fluctuations in collateral values. 
This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1: A change in collateral value has a lower impact on financing and investment for 
firms with higher reporting quality (than for firms with lower reporting quality). 
 
Next, we study how a firm changes its reporting quality in response to the change in 
collateral value. The change in collateral value causes a shift in financing capacity. This change 
can cause a firm to change its reporting practices if managers perceive a higher benefit to 
disclosure, because disclosure mitigates the potentially larger reduction in financing costs 
associated with higher information asymmetry (Verrecchia [2001]). The intuition is that firms 
adjust their reporting choices based on cost-benefit tradeoffs, and that a change in collateral 
values will affect future reporting choices. In other words, when a change takes place that affects 
collateral value, the change shifts the disclosure cost-benefit tradeoff, and firms may re-optimize 
their reporting quality. We state this hypothesis below: 
H2: An increase (decrease) in collateral value is associated with a decrease (increase) in 
reporting quality. 
 
3. Research Design 
In this section, we describe our research design and the data used in the paper. We test 
the above hypotheses using the following reduced-form specifications: 
H1: Investmentt = f(change in collateralt, reporting qualityt-1, controls) 
H1: Financingt = f(change in collateralt, reporting qualityt-1, controls) 
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H2: Reporting qualityt = f(change in collateralt, controls) 
In the above equations, reporting quality serves both as an explanatory variable and as a 
dependent variable. The idea is a dynamic setting in which firms choose reporting quality, then 
choose financing and investment, and then repeat the process by again choosing reporting 
quality, financing and investment, and so on. Firms choose reporting quality at time t-1 in part 
based on their expectation of future financing and investment needs, and in part based on other 
costs and benefits (e.g., proprietary costs). While this makes reporting quality endogenous with 
respect to expected financing and investment, reporting quality at t-1 is arguably exogenous with 
respect to an unanticipated change in financing capacity. We test Hypothesis 1 by investigating 
whether the effect of the change on investment and financing is a function of the level of 
reporting quality before the change in collateral value. Hypothesis 2 then endogenizes reporting 
quality by studying how the change in financing capacity affects the firm's reporting choices 
subsequent to the change.   
3.1  Data  
We start with the sample of active Compustat firms in 1993 with non-missing total assets. 
We start the sample period in 1993 because this was the last year of an SEC requirement that 
firms report the accumulated depreciation of buildings; we use the historic depreciation of 
buildings to estimate the current value of real estate (described below). We retain firms whose 
headquarters are located in the United States, leaving us with a sample of 8,459 unique firms. 
We exclude from the sample those firms operating in the finance, insurance, real estate, 
construction, and mining industries, as well as firms involved in major takeovers. We retain 
firms that appear for at least three consecutive years in the sample, resulting in a sample of 
25,797 firm-year observations for the sample period of 1993 to 2009. In this sample, there are 
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2,795 unique firms out of which 1,610 own real estate in 1993, and 1,185 own no real estate in 
1993. 
The key construct for our study is the effect of the change in real estate prices on the 
value of a firm’s real estate assets. To compute this variable, we first measure the market value 
of a firm’s real estate assets. We define real estate assets as buildings, land and improvement, 
and construction in progress (Compustat variables FATB, FATC and FATP). In essence, this is 
the property and plant subset of property, plant, and equipment. These assets are not marked-to-
market, but are valued at historical cost. To estimate their market value, we follow Chaney et al. 
[2012] and estimate the average time since their acquisition. To do this, we measure the ratio of 
the accumulated depreciation of buildings to the historic cost of buildings, which gives us the 
proportion of the original value of a building that has been depreciated. Assuming that, on 
average, the depreciable life is 40 years, the average age of buildings for a given firm is 40 
multiplied by the proportion depreciated. An illustration of this approach is provided in 
Appendix A for International Business Machines (IBM). In this example, we estimate the 
average age of the buildings to be approximately 19 years (i.e., the real estate IBM owned in 
1993, it acquired in 1974, on average).  
Next, we use real estate price indices to estimate the market value of real estate assets in 
1993 and then track the change in the market value of these assets for each subsequent year as a 
function of changes in real estate prices. Following Chaney et al. [2012], we use state-level real 
estate prices. (As we discuss below, the use of state prices is not crucial as we obtain similar 
results when we instead use average prices for the U.S.) We obtain residential price indices from 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (O.F.H.E.O). We use residential real estate 
prices as a proxy for commercial real estate prices because office real estate data are not 
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available for the entire country, and even then, this data is not available until 1985 (Chaney et al. 
[2012]). Data on state-level residential prices starts in 1975. For the years before 1975, we use 
the consumer price index (CPI) to adjust real estate prices.  
We estimate the value of real estate assets held in 1993 as the book value at the time of 
the acquisition multiplied by the cumulative price increase from the acquisition date to 1993.  
We then estimate the value of these assets for the subsequent years as the market value at 1993 
multiplied by the cumulative price increase from 1993 to a given year. Appendix A illustrates 
this computation for IBM.  
It is worth noting that following Chaney et al.’s [2012] methodology, we do not 
incorporate the value of any real estate acquisitions or dispositions following 1993. An 
advantage of this approach is that it helps mitigate any endogeneity between real estate value and 
investments, since any future variation in the value of real estate assets is driven only by 
variation in real estate prices (and not by the firm’s future investments). However, the downside 
of this approach is that it introduces noise into our measure because the value of real estate in a 
given year is not precisely estimated. The trade-off between endogeneity and measurement error 
is also evident in the IBM illustration in Appendix A. For example, IBM disposed of its PC 
business in 2005, but this asset sale is ignored by our approach. Thus, in Section 4.5.2 we 
perform a number of sensitivity tests to assess the effect of potential measurement error in our 
tests. 
3.2 Empirical Specification  
3.2.1 Investments, Collateral Value, and Reporting Quality 
To examine the effect of reporting quality and collateral values on investment, we build 
on specifications used in prior literature. Traditionally, previous research has predicted that 
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investment is a function of growth opportunities (Tobin’s q), cash flows, and other explanatory 
variables (e.g., Fazzari et al. [1988], Hubbard [1998], Lamont [1997], Richardson [2006], 
Almeida and Campello [2007]). More recently, Chaney et al. [2012] extend this literature by 
estimating a model that includes exogenous fluctuations in collateral prices to study the relation 
between collateral values and investment. Chaney et al. estimate the following model: 
.__ 1
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
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where i is a firm fixed effect, INV is capital expenditures scaled by lagged assets, and X is a 
vector of control variables (measured as of t-1) that includes year fixed effects. The innovation in 
Chaney et al. [2012] is to introduce a measure of exogenous fluctuations in the value of real 
estate assets by including RE_VALUE in Eq. (1). RE_VALUE is computed as follows: 
)_*_(_ 93,93,, tsiti INDEXSTATEVALUEREVALUERE      (2) 
Thus, RE_VALUE is the market value of real estate in 1993 (calculated as described in Section 
3.1 above), multiplied by an index of state-level real estate prices from 1993 to year t. Since 
firms had different amounts of real estate assets in 1993, RE_VALUE consists of cross-sectional 
variation in the initial value of real estate assets as well as time-series variation in the values of 
those assets due to variation in real estate prices. Our identification uses this variation to isolate 
the effect of changes in collateral values on investment, financing, and reporting quality. We 
normalize RE_VALUE by total assets in year t-1, which is also the deflator for investment and 
financing. 
  In Eq. (1), STATE_INDEXst
 
is a control for the change in real estate prices in state s from 
1993 to year t. This variable, in conjunction with year fixed-effects, controls for macroeconomic 
changes (e.g., recessions, expansions, changes in interest rates) that affect the economy as a 
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whole. The firm fixed-effects gives the coefficients a changes interpretation, i.e., Chaney et al. 
[2012] find a positive coefficient 1 , and interpret it as evidence that a change in real estate value 
is associated with a change in investment. 
Note that the firm fixed effect in Eq. (1) removes the firm mean. It can also be estimated 
(with an appropriate adjustment to degrees of freedom) as: 
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where the “~” above the variable name indicates that the firm mean has been subtracted from the 
variable, e.g., 
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 Our prediction in Hypothesis 1 is that changes in investment will be less sensitive to real 
estate prices when the level of reporting quality is higher (we examine changes in reporting 
quality in Hypothesis 2). In order to test this prediction, we include an interaction between 
reporting quality and the effect of interest. Thus, we modify Eq. (3) by introducing an interaction 
between italueVRE
~_  and reporting quality. We also include a main effect for reporting quality.3 
Specifically we estimate the following: 
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where FRQ, measured at year t-1, is one of our six proxies for reporting quality (the information 
asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread (IAC_spread), timely loss recognition (TLR_BASU), 
the length of MD&A (MDA_LENGTH), the number of 8Ks filed by the company (COUNT_8K), 
                                                 
3 Implicit in our model (and in Chaney et al. [2012]) is the assumption that the firms in the sample are under-
investing. We investigate this assumption in Section 4.5.1, where we further decompose our tests into firms that are 
more likely to over- or under-invest. 
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the number of management forecasts (MGMT_FCST), and a composite measure of reporting 
quality (FRQ_INDEX1). We describe these measures below.  
In Eq. (5), we remove the means from the same variables as in Eq. (1), but not from FRQ. 
This specification allows us to interpret 1 as the average sensitivity of the change in investment 
to changes in collateral prices. Chaney et al. [2012] show that the sensitivity of changes in 
investment to changes in collateral prices (i.e., 1 ) is positive, a finding that suggests that firms 
invest more (less) when real estate assets experience an increase (decrease) in value. Thus, if 
reporting quality attenuates this effect, then we predict that the estimated coefficient will be 
negative. 
Our approach in Eq. (5) assumes that reporting quality prior to the change is a pre-
determined variable that will affect the increase in information asymmetry due to the change in 
real estate prices. As discussed in the beginning of this section, reporting quality at t-1 is 
arguably exogenous with respect to a subsequent (unanticipated) change in financing capacity 
(although it may be endogenous with respect to expected financing and investment). When we 
later test Hypothesis 2, we examine whether firms, subsequent to observing their financing 
capacity following a real estate change, then adjust their reporting quality.  
Following prior literature (e.g., Richardson [2006], Almeida and Campello [2007], 
Biddle et al. [2009]), in Eq. (5) we control for contemporaneous cash flow (cash flow from 
operations divided by lagged assets)4, lagged Tobin’s Q (measured as the market value of assets 
divided by the book value of assets), the logarithm of lagged market value of equity, lagged age 
                                                 
4 We define cash flow as cash flow from operations, which differs from Chaney et al. [2012], who define cash flow 
as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization. While this latter definition is widely used 
in the finance literature, it has potential shortcomings because it includes accruals, which are “investments” in 
working capital (Bushman et al. [2010]). 
2
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(measured as the logarithm of the number of years a firm has a record in Compustat), and lagged 
leverage (measured as the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of 
assets). In addition to these control variables, all of our specifications include year fixed-effects. 
Following Chaney et al. [2012], we cluster standard errors using a two-dimensional 
cluster at the state and year levels, which addresses both cross-sectional and firm-specific 
dependence. By clustering in this way, our standard errors are conservative, given that the 
explanatory variables of interest are defined at the firm level (see Bertrand, Duflo, and 
Mullainathan [2004]).  
Before we proceed, we discuss a potential source of endogeneity.  Changes in real estate 
prices could proxy for something other than changes in collateral value and financing capacity 
(e.g., changes in growth opportunities). If the firm’s choice to own real estate is correlated with 
its expected growth opportunities, the estimated sensitivity of investment to real estate prices can 
be biased upwards. For example, for a homebuilder operating in a given state, an increase in real 
estate prices indicates greater growth opportunities as well as greater collateral. To mitigate this 
concern, we exclude industries that are more likely to be affected by this issue (e.g., real estate 
and construction). Further, we control for proxies intended to capture growth opportunities such 
as state-level real estate prices, year fixed-effects, Tobin’s q, and cash flows.  
In addition, while the direction of the bias is in favor of a positive sensitivity of 
investment to real estate (i.e., 1 in Eq. 5), in terms of the interaction with reporting quality (i.e., 
2 in Eq. 5), there could be a bias against us finding our results. Specifically, Bushman et al. 
[2011] find that high reporting quality firms have a higher sensitivity of investment to changes in 
growth opportunities because reporting quality lowers adverse selection costs and allows these 
firms to raise more capital and further tap into the growth opportunities. In contrast, we predict 
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that high reporting quality firms will have a lower sensitivity of investment (and financing) to 
changes in collateral values because reporting quality lowers the firm’s need for collateral.  
3.2.2 Financing, collateral value, and reporting quality 
To test Hypothesis 1 with respect to financing, we modify Eq. (5) by replacing 
investment as the dependent variable with measures of external finance raised by the company. 
Specifically we estimate the following: 
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            (6) 
where
~
_ FINEXT  is one of the three measures of net finance raised by a firm – 
~
_ NETDEBT , 
~
_ NETEQUITY , and 
~
_ NETFIN . As before, FRQ, is one of our six proxies for reporting 
quality, as in Eq. (5), and the “~” above the variable name indicates that the firm mean has been 
subtracted from the variable. We focus on debt, equity, and total financing, as prior research has 
shown that reporting quality can affect both debt and equity financing. 
Chaney et al. [2012] show that financing is sensitive to changes in collateral prices. Our 
hypothesis is that financing will be less sensitive to a change in real estate prices when reporting 
quality is higher. Thus we predict that the estimated coefficient 1 will be positive and the 
coefficient 2 will be negative.  
Following Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan [2006], we measure net debt financing as 
the net cash received from (paid for) the issuance (reduction) of debt (Compustat variable DLTIS 
minus DLTR plus DLCCH, where we set DLCCH to zero if missing). DEBT_NET is the ratio of 
net debt financing in a given year scaled by the lagged value of assets (Lemmon and Roberts 
[2010], Leary and Roberts [2005]).  We measure net equity financing as the net cash received 
from the sale (repurchase) of equity, less common dividends (Compustat variable SSTK minus 
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PRSTKC minus DVC).5 EQUITY_NET is the ratio of net equity financing in a given year 
(Compustat variable SSTK) scaled by the lagged value of assets. FIN_NET is the sum of debt 
and equity financing in a given year scaled by the lagged value of assets. Finally, we control for 
contemporaneous cash flow (cash flow from operations divided by lagged assets), lagged 
Tobin’s Q (measured as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets) and the 
logarithm of lagged market value of equity, lagged age (measured as the logarithm of the number 
of years a firm has a record in Compustat). 
3.2.3 Reporting responses to changes in collateral value 
In the previous section, we used reporting quality prior to the change as a conditioning 
variable that mitigates the effect of real estate price changes on investment. That specification 
assumes that reporting quality in the prior period is a pre-determined variable (with respect to an 
unanticipated change in financing capacity). However, as discussed in Section 2, a 
complementary prediction is that firms adjust their reporting choices based on cost-benefit 
tradeoffs, and that a change in collateral values affects future reporting choices (Hypothesis 2).  
We test this hypothesis by estimating a regression of reporting quality on changes in 
collateral. The model is similar to the one in Eq. (1) but uses reporting quality as the dependent 
variable (as opposed to investment): 
,__ 1
1
11 itjit
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where FRQt is one of our proxies for reporting quality (MDA_LENGTH, COUNT_8K, 
MGMT_FCST, IAC_SPREAD and a composite measure, FRQ_INDEX2, described below) and 
                                                 
5 We do not subtract preferred dividends from net equity issuances, as we consider these to be largely 
nondiscretionary and analogous to interest payments. 
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i is a firm fixed effect.6 Note that we estimate Eq. (7) directly with firm-fixed effects whereas 
we estimate the investment and financing models above by first de-meaning the variables and 
estimating Eq. (5) and (6) above. This is because our first hypothesis pertains to the level of 
reporting quality whereas Hypothesis 2 relates to the change in reporting quality. 
Our second hypothesis is that firms will increase (decrease) reporting quality in response 
to a decrease (increase) in real estate prices. Thus we predict that the coefficient 1  will be 
negative. Again, the presence of the firm fixed effect allows the coefficients to be interpreted as 
changes. Thus, if we find a negative coefficient 1 , we will interpret it as a decrease in the value 
of real estate assets being associated with an increase in reporting quality. 
In Eq. (7), consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Healy et al. [1999], Lang and 
Lundholm [2000], Leuz and Verrecchia [2000]), we control for ROA (measured as operating 
income before depreciation and amortization divided by total assets) and the logarithm of the 
market value of equity (MVE). We also control for Q, the logarithm of LEVERAGE, and the 
logarithm of AGE. Finally, in addition to these control variables, we include year indicator 
variables. 
 
3.2.4 Measures of Reporting Quality 
In our tests, we use five proxies for reporting quality and two composite indexes.  
IAC_spread measures the extent to which unexpected order flow affects prices and is 
increasing in information asymmetry. This variable measures the effect of information 
asymmetry on the stock price (i.e., the price impact or adverse selection that results from 
                                                 
6 Note that for this test we do not use timely loss recognition (TLR_BASU). We compute this proxy at the industry 
level, and do not expect firm changes in disclosure policy to affect it. 
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information asymmetry among investors). It is intended as an ex-post proxy for (the inverse of) 
reporting quality based on several prior studies that document a negative relation between 
reporting quality and the bid-ask spread (e.g., Verrecchia [2001]). A caveat with this measure, 
however, is that high levels of information asymmetry might lead firms to increase disclosure in 
response to it, which is not the relation we want to capture. Thus, the use of this measure 
assumes an average negative relation between reporting quality and information asymmetry.    
We estimate IAC_spread following Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans [1997] (as 
described in Armstrong et al. [2011]). The resulting estimate expresses the information 
asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread as a percentage of price (“IAC_spread”). Because 
running the algorithm is very time-consuming, we measure IAC_spread for each firm once a 
year at its fiscal year-end, using all intra-day data for that month. Again, to give the variable the 
interpretation of increasing reporting quality, we multiply it by negative one. Further, given the 
noise inherent in the process of estimating IAC_Spread, we include this measure as a ranked 
variable (converted into deciles) in all our tests. We then re-scale it to range from zero to one. 
We also use timely loss recognition (TLR_BASU) computed at the industry-level (e.g., 
Wittenberg-Moerman [2008], Ball, Bushman and Vasvari [2008]). To the extent that debtholders 
(common suppliers of collateralized capital) are more sensitive to borrower’s losses and firms 
with more conservative financial reporting are less likely to report losses ex-post, conservative 
accounting can facilitate access to credit markets. Consistent with this argument, Wittenberg-
Moerman [2008] shows that firms with higher timely-loss recognition (her proxy for 
conservative reporting) have lower debt financing costs.  
Following Wittenberg-Moerman [2008] we employ an industry-level estimation of 
timely-loss recognition using the Basu [1997] methodology at the 3-digit SIC level. An 
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advantage of this measure is that, because it is measured at the industry level, there is a less of a 
concern about endogeneity.7 We measure TLR_BASU as follows. For each 3-digit SIC industry-
year in Compustat, we estimate the following piecewise-linear regression of annual price-
deflated earnings (NIit) on annual stock returns (Rit, ending three months after the end of the 
fiscal year) and stock returns interacted with a dummy variable for negative returns (DRit):  
NIit = b0 + b1 DRit + b2 Rit + b3 Rit * DRit + uit    (8) 
TLR_BASU is measured as the sum of b2 and b3. This industry-level measure of timely loss 
recognition is then assigned to each firm in a given industry. 
 We also use the length of the MD&A, the issuances of 8Ks and the issuance of 
management forecasts as proxies for reporting quality. The sample for these proxies begins in 
1995 because it is the first year with available SEC filings on EDGAR’s website to collect 
MD&A and 8K information and because First Call coverage improves significantly post-1994 
(e.g., Rogers and Stocken [2005], Ng, Tuna, and Verdi [2013]). 
We use the length of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of the 
10-K reports filed by firms as a proxy for reporting quality. We retrieve firms’ 10-K filings from 
SEC EDGAR and then employ text-mining programs to extract the MD&A section. The 
MDA_LENGTH is the number of words in the MD&A section of the 10-K statement. Recent 
studies provide evidence that the forward-looking statements in a firm’s MD&A are positively 
correlated with its future earnings and have explanatory power over other variables that can 
predict future performance (e.g., Li [2010], Feldman et al. [2010]). This suggests that the MD&A 
                                                 
7 Patatoukas and Thomas [2011] argue that the Basu measure is biased. Ball, Kothari and Nikolaev [2013] show that 
controlling for size, book-to-market, leverage, and volatility in the Basu regression addresses potential estimation 
biases. In untabulated analyses we follow the suggestions in Ball et al. [2013], and find that our inferences are 
unaffected.   
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is a reasonable proxy for reporting quality. Using similar logic, Leuz and Schrand [2009] employ 
MD&A length as their primary measure of disclosure. 
 We also employ the number of 8K forms (COUNT_8K) filed by the firm. This variable is 
also used by Leuz and Schrand [2009] when investigating disclosure responses to the Enron 
event. The SEC requires that firms use the 8K form to disclose material information and to 
update any information provided in previous SEC filings. While the SEC lays out specific 
reportable events, the guidelines are generic enough that firms have discretion in filing an 8K for 
other information.  
 Our final proxy is the issuance of earnings forecasts by the management (MGMT_FCST). 
Several papers have used management forecasts as a proxy for voluntary disclosure activity. 
Overall, this literature shows that management forecasts provide information to the market and 
that they are associated with market returns and analyst forecast revisions. Prior research that 
examines earnings forecasts suggests that managers who wish to enhance transparency issue 
more frequent, specific, and accurate forecasts (Skinner [1994], Kasznik and Lev [1995], Kim 
and Verrecchia [1991]). In addition, investors and analysts react to these forecasts, which 
suggests that they have information content (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift [1984], Waymire [1984], 
Jennings [1987], Williams [1996]). We acknowledge that all of these disclosure measures are 
noisy because managers may disclose for reasons other than to improve the information 
environment; for example, they may disclose in response to abstain-or-disclose rules (Li, 
Wasley, and Zimmerman [2011]).  
 We note that, while we use several proxies for reporting quality, none of these proxies are 
perfect and they vary in terms of relative strength and measurement error. Thus, we also create 
two composite indexes in which we aggregate the individual proxies for reporting quality with 
 23 
 
the intent of reducing measurement error in the individual proxies. For the tests of Hypothesis 1, 
we create FRQ_INDEX1 as the average of standardized values of IAC_SPREAD, TLR_BASU, 
MDA_LENGTH, COUNT_8K and MGMT_FCST (we require at least two of the individual 
proxies to be available to compute the index). Since these variables are used as explanatory 
variables in Eq.  (5) and (6), all variables are measured as of year t-1. For the tests of Hypothesis 
2, we create FRQ_INDEX2 as the average of standardized values of IAC_SPREAD, 
MDA_LENGTH, COUNT_8K and MGMT_FCST (i.e., TLR_BASU is not included since it is not 
used in the tests for H2). Again, we require at least two of the individual proxies to be available 
to compute the index. In this case, since these variables are used as dependent variables in Eq. 
(7), all variables are measured as of year t. 
4.  Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. Following 
Chaney et al. [2012], we winsorize all variables at the 5th and 95th percentiles. In robustness tests 
discussed below, we examine the sensitivity of our results to winsorization at 1%.We begin with 
our measures of investment, financing, collateral, and real estate prices. The mean value for INV 
suggests that the firms in our sample invest, in a given year, approximately 6.54% of their lagged 
assets. The mean values for DEBT_NET are 1.41% of lagged assets; for EQUITY_NET, 2.57% of 
lagged assets; and for FIN_NET, 4.98% of lagged assets. The mean annual change in real estate 
prices (STATE_INDEXt-1,t) equals 4% (the gross value in the table is 1.04), whereas the mean 
cumulative change in our sample (STATE_INDEX93,t) equals 41%. The mean RE_VALUE equals 
0.27, which means that the current value of real estate (property and plant) is equal to 27% of the 
book value of lagged assets.   
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We now turn to our proxies for reporting quality. Although we use standardized values of 
these variables in our tests, we report raw values in Table 1 in order to enable a comparison with 
prior research (e.g., Armstrong et al. [2011], Ball et al. [2008]). The mean for IAC_SPREAD is -
0.23% (recall that IAC_SPREAD is multiplied by -1) whereas that of TLR_BASU is 0.12. The 
mean number of words in the MD&A (MDA_LENGTH) is 5,430, comparable to prior studies 
(e.g., Li [2008], Feldman et al. [2010]). The mean firm in our sample files 6.9 8Ks and 1.3 
management forecasts in a given year.  Table 1 Panel B presents the correlations between all 
measures used in this study. FRQ_INDEX1 and FRQ_INDEX2 are positively correlated with all 
financial reporting quality measures used in this paper. 
4.2 Role of Reporting Quality in Investment Response to Changes in Collateral 
Table 2 presents the results of our tests of Hypothesis 1. The first column replicates the 
regression specification in Chaney et al. [2012]. A key result in Chaney et al. is a positive and 
significant coefficient on RE_VALUE. This suggests that when firm real estate values increase 
due to changes in real estate prices, investments increase. Specifically, the estimated coefficient 
of 2.15 suggests that for each dollar increase in the value of real estate, investment increases by 
2.15 cents. We observe similar positive significant coefficients across all columns in Table 2.8 
The next six columns provide evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1. The coefficient of 
interest is the interaction between the value of real estate (RE_VALUE) and the proxies for 
reporting quality. To facilitate interpretation, all reporting quality proxies are standardized to 
have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This way the coefficient on the interaction 
between reporting quality and RE_VALUE may be interpreted as the change in sensitivity when 
                                                 
8 The estimated coefficient of 2.15 is smaller than the one reported in Chaney et al. [2012]. The difference occurs 
because we deflate investment and financing by lagged assets whereas Chaney et al. deflate by lagged PPE in their 
main tests. Chaney et al. report in their footnote 9 that, when they use lagged assets as a deflator, they also find a 
smaller coefficient.   
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the reporting quality increases by one standard deviation. The coefficients on the interaction 
between RE_VALUE and the FRQ proxies are negative and significant (an exception is the 
interaction between RE_VALUE and IAC_SPREAD, which has a t-statistic of 1.61). For example, 
the coefficient when using TLR_BASU is -0.60. Thus, while the sensitivity of investments to real 
estate prices is 2.27 for the average firm in our sample (based on TLR_BASU) (this number 
equals the coefficient on RE_VALUE in Table 2, Column 3), the sensitivity for a firm with a one 
standard deviation higher value for TLR_BASU is only 1.67 (= 2.27-0.60), a decrease of 26%. 
The specification in the last column uses our composite measure of reporting quality, 
FRQ_INDEX1, as an alternate measure of reporting quality; the results are consistent.  
Overall the results in Table 2 are consistent with our first hypothesis that the change in 
collateral value has a lower impact on investment for firms with higher reporting quality than on 
firms with lower reporting quality. In other words, investment is more sensitive to collateral 
values when reporting quality is low.  
4.3 Role of Reporting Quality on the Effect of Changes in Collateral on Financing 
Table 3 examines the effect of financial reporting quality on the sensitivity of a firm’s 
financing activities to changes in collateral values. We present results based on our composite 
reporting quality index, FRQ_INDEX1. The coefficients of interest are the main effect on 
RE_VALUE as well as the interaction between RE_VALUE and FRQ_INDEX1, and we predict 
that these coefficients will be positive and negative, respectively.   
In Column 1, we examine net debt financing (DEBT_NET). The main effect on 
RE_VALUE is positive and significant, but the coefficient on the interaction term for 
FRQ_INDEX1 is insignificant. This suggests that when collateral prices go up, firms with both 
low and high reporting quality issue more debt. In contrast, when we examine net equity 
 26 
 
financing (EQUITY_NET - column 2), the main effect on RE_VALUE is insignificant, but the 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant. In this case, when collateral prices 
go up, firms with low reporting quality do not increase their equity financing whereas firms with 
high reporting quality reduce their equity financing.  
Column 3 presents results for the sum of net debt and net equity financing (FIN_NET). 
The main effect is positive and marginally significant (coefficient of 2.17 and t-statistic of 1.46), 
and the interaction term is negative and significant (coefficient of -2.48 and t-statistic of 2.79). 
These results suggest that net financing for firms with low reporting quality is positively 
associated (though weak in statistical terms) with increases in collateral values, but for firms 
with high reporting quality, net financing is not affected by changes in collateral prices [e.g., for 
a firm with an one standard deviation higher reporting quality the effect equals -0.31 (=2.17-
2.48)].9 
Taken together, these results provide a more nuanced interpretation than our hypothesis 
of the effect of changes in collateral value on financing conditional on reporting quality. 
Specifically, when the value of collateral goes up, firms with low reporting quality issue more 
debt and use this capital to finance investment. This is consistent with our predictions and 
evidence in Table 2. In contrast, for firms with high reporting quality, when collateral goes up 
they also issue debt but, instead of using these funds to invest, they return the capital to 
shareholders. In other words, firms with low reporting quality use changes in collateral values to 
                                                 
9 In untabulated analyses, we also use the individual reporting quality proxies in the financing tests, and find results 
similar to those presented in Table 3. Specifically, the main effect for RE_VALUE is positive (insignificant) in the 
debt (equity) models whereas the interaction term between RE_VALUE and the proxies for reporting quality is 
insignificant (negative) for these respective models. Further, in the net total financing models, the main effect for 
RE_VALUE is weakly positive whereas the interaction term is negative. 
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alleviate their financing constraints whereas firms with high reporting quality take advantage of 
collateralized financing to rebalance their capital structure.  
4.4 Reporting Quality Response to Changes in Collateral Value  
 Our next set of tests examines our second hypothesis, that firms will adjust their reporting 
quality in response to changes in collateral. Table 4 presents the estimates of Eq. (7). Column (1) 
uses the length of the MD&A as the measure of reporting quality (MDA_LENGTH). The 
negative and significant coefficient on the RE_VALUE suggests that a decrease (increase) in real 
estate prices leads to an increase (decrease) in the length of the MD&A. In terms of economic 
significance, a one standard deviation increase in RE_VALUE is associated with a decrease in the 
length of the MD&A by 310 words.  Given that the mean value of MDA_LENGTH is 5,430, this 
represents a reduction of 6%.10 Columns 2 through 5 present the results for the remaining proxies 
for reporting quality. We find similar results with one-year-ahead COUNT_8K, IAC_SPREAD, 
MGMT_FCST, as well as with the composite measure FRQ_INDEX2. In sum, the evidence in 
Table 4 is consistent with our second hypothesis, that firms increase (decrease) reporting quality 
when real estate values decrease (increase). 
4.5  Additional Tests 
4.5.1 Over- vs. Under-investment 
We conclude from our analysis thus far that reporting quality mitigates financing 
constraints. Implicit in this conclusion is an assumption that our sample firms, on average, have 
constrained financing capacity and that an increase in collateral value mitigates under-
investment. However, it is possible that some of our sample firms do not face financing 
                                                 
10 The negative coefficients for ROA and Q appear, a priori, to be inconsistent with the previous literature. We note, 
however, that our specification uses a changes specification instead of levels. Leuz and Schrand [2009] also find a 
negative coefficient on ROA and Q when looking at the change in disclosure (but a positive coefficient on levels).  
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constraints. In this case, when collateral values increase, any extra investment might be excessive 
instead of efficient investment.  
In order to examine the sensitivity of our results to potential over-investment, we follow 
Biddle et al. [2009] and categorize firms into two sub-samples based on their propensity to 
under- or over-invest. Specifically, we first rank firms into deciles based on their cash balance 
and their leverage (we multiply leverage by minus one before ranking so that, as for cash, it is 
increasing with the likelihood of over-investment) and re-scale them to range between zero and 
one. We create a composite score measure as the average of the ranked values of the two 
partitioning variables and compare firms in the extreme terciles of the distribution. We classify 
firm- years in the highest tercile as those that are likely to over-invest; those in the bottom tercile 
are firms that are likely to under-invest.  
We then examine the effect of changes in collateral values on investments, financing and 
reporting quality in both these subsamples. Firms in the bottom tercile have low cash and/or high 
leverage and are likely to be financially constrained. These are the firms to which our above 
hypotheses are most likely to apply. For the firms in the highest tercile (classified as more likely 
to over-invest), however, the predictions are less clear. On one hand, evidence in Biddle et al. 
[2009] and others suggests that reporting quality mitigates over-investment. This result suggests 
that firms more likely to over-invest with high reporting quality also could be less likely to over-
invest after an increase in collateral. On the other hand, firms more likely to over-invest have 
rich internal resources, so that it is unclear whether a change in collateral value would affect their 
investing, financing, and reporting choices.  
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Table 5 compares the results for the over- and under-investment samples for investment, 
financing, and reporting quality, respectively.11 Columns 1 and 2 compare investment for the two 
samples. For the over-investment sample (Column 1), the main effect on RE_VALUE for 
investment is insignificant, but the interaction is significantly negative. In contrast, for the under-
investment sample (Column 2), the main effect on RE_VALUE for investment is positive, and the 
interaction is significantly negative. The difference between the coefficients on RE_VALUE 
suggests that firms prone to under-investment are more sensitive to changes in collateral value 
than firms prone to over-investment (t-statistic for the difference of 3.17).  In addition, this result 
holds for firms with higher reporting quality as proxied by the joint effect of RE_VALUE and its 
interaction with reporting quality (t-statistic for the difference of 3.19). The differences in 
financing shown in Columns 3 and 4 are similar. Over-investing firms do not react to the 
collateral change, while under-investing firms show a significant change in financing. As for 
reporting quality (Hypothesis 2), we find evidence that changes in collateral are associated with 
changes in reporting quality for the over-investment sample (Column 5), but the under-
investment sample (Column 6) reacts slightly more strongly (t-statistic for the difference of 
1.60). Thus, our findings in Table 5 are consistent with the effects we document arising from 
firms suffering from potential under-investment.12 
4.5.2  Identification Tests 
 
Our tests implicitly assume that a firm’s real estate assets (or at least a large portion of 
them) are located in the same state as the firm’s headquarters. As a way of assessing the 
                                                 
11 We use the full sample to divide firms based on their likelihood of over-investing. Thus, when we intersect this 
ranking with our reporting quality measures, it results in different numbers of observations across the four columns. 
12 As a second approach, Gan [2007] uses quantile regressions (at the 90th percentile of the investment distribution) 
to study whether collateral affects major investments, on the assumption that major investments are less likely to 
capture moral hazard (over-investment) problems. In untabulated analysis, we follow a similar methodology and 
find that our results on investment continue to hold, providing additional evidence on under-investment. 
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importance of this assumption, we re-run our tests using a U.S. price index instead of the state 
price indices.  Column 2 of Table 6 shows these results (first for investment, then for total 
financing, and finally for reporting quality as the dependent variable), which are very similar to 
the results shown in Column 1, which show the main results from Tables 2 through 4. Given that 
state real price changes have a substantial systematic (U.S.) component, this result suggests that 
the idiosyncratic statewide component from state prices is not providing identification.  
To further explore this result, we conduct randomization tests. We start by randomizing 
the state that a given firm is assigned. Specifically, instead of using the real estate price for the 
state in which the firm’s headquarter is assigned, we assign a firm to a random state other than 
the state of the headquarters. Column 3 of Table 6 presents these findings. We find that 
randomizing the state yields identical inference, again suggesting that the state location is not 
crucial for our identification. As discussed in the prior paragraph, a primary explanation for this 
is that the cumulative state indexes are highly correlated over time (average state pairwise 
correlation of 0.84), and therefore randomizing leads to little difference.  
We then perform two additional randomization tests to determine whether the 
identification is coming from cross-sectional or time-series variation in the value of real estate 
assets. Specifically, to explore the time-series variation, we randomize itALUEVRE
~_ over time 
holding the firm constant; this is akin to assigning a given firm a placebo yearly change in the 
value of its real estate assets over its time-series. Second, to explore the cross-sectional variation, 
we randomize itALUEVRE
~_ across firms holding the year constant; in this case the test is akin to 
assigning a given firm the change in the value of the real estate assets of a placebo firm in the 
cross-section. 
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The last two columns of Table 6 present these results. In both cases the main effect for 
RE_VALUE and the interaction between RE_VALUE and FRQ are no longer significant. This 
suggests that the identification in our paper crucially depends on the initial value of real estate 
assets; this initial value induces cross-sectional and time-series variation in the value of real 
estate assets among our firms. Finally, as noted above, about 42% of our sample has no real 
estate in 1993. To ensure that our randomization tests are not simply capturing the choice of 
ownership, we drop non-owners, and repeat the randomization tests. The results for this 
subsample (untabulated) are very similar to the results in Table 6. This suggests that the 
identification in our paper depends, not only on the choice of ownership in 1993, but also on the 
magnitude of real estate owned by a firm. 
4.5.3  Measurement Error in Real Estate Values 
We use the methodology in Chaney et al. [2012] to identify exogenous variation in the 
value of a firm’s real estate assets. The main advantage of this approach is that it mitigates 
endogeneity concerns (e.g., that variations in real estate assets proxy for future growth 
opportunities), but it requires assumptions that lead to potential measurement errors in the data. 
In this section, we discuss these assumptions and provide sensitivity tests.  
An important measurement concern is that we value a firm’s real estate assets in 1993, 
and then assume that value evolves over time based on changes in real estate prices. This 
procedure ignores the firm’s real estate purchases and sales after 1993. To investigate whether 
this source of measurement error affects our results, we consider two extreme cases. First, we 
identify firms that initially had real estate in 1993, but later sold all of their real estate 
(“disposers”). In our sample, there are approximately 1,688 firm-year observations that occur 
after a complete sale of real estate. Second, we identify firms that initially had no real estate in 
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1993, but later acquired real estate (“acquirers”). In our sample, there are approximately 3,382 
firm-year observations that occur after an initial real estate purchase. We then re-estimate the 
main regressions in the paper (Eq. 5 to 7) for these two sub-samples.13 
These results are presented in Columns 2 to 4 of Table 7 Panel A (Column 1 presents the 
results for the main sample to facilitate comparison). In Column 2 we first present the results for 
the firms that own real estate in 1993 (1,610 firms as discussed in Section 3.1 above) but without 
the firm years after the “disposal.” The resulting sample is 11,959 firm-years. This provides a 
way to assess the measurement error driven by inclusion of firms (and firm-years) without real 
estate and also serves as a benchmark to compare the results for the “disposers” sample. The 
results in Column 2 yield inferences similar to the results with the full sample, although the 
coefficients of interest tend to be larger in absolute magnitude. For instance, the coefficient on 
RE_VALUE increases from 2.20 to 2.98 for investment, increases from 2.17 to 7.09 for 
financing, and decreases from -0.15 to -0.21 for disclosure. As for the interaction with reporting 
quality, the magnitude of the coefficients also increases.  
In Column 3, we find that disposers, after the disposal, have a lower sensitivity to real 
estate prices and an interaction with reporting quality that is smaller in magnitude. For example, 
the coefficient on RE_VALUE, when compared to the firms with real estate (Column 2), 
decreases by 48% (from 2.98 to 1.56) in the investment model. This suggests that real estate 
disposers, after they sell real estate, have a diminished sensitivity to real estate prices. In Column 
4, we find that real estate purchasers, after they acquire real estate, have a positive sensitivity to 
                                                 
13 For firms in the ‘acquirer’ group, we estimate the value of their real estate during the acquisition year as the 
acquisition cost. We then use the state index prices to compute the market value of this real estate over the 
remainder of the sample period. For example, suppose a firm acquires $50 million in real estate in 2000. We track 
the subsequent market value of this real estate using the state index prices (i.e., $50 million times the cumulative 
state index in a given year, and deflated by assets as described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 above), and then correlate it 
with investment decisions during the period of 2001 to 2009. 
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real estate prices and a negative, but insignificant, interaction with reporting quality. Overall 
these results suggest that (1) real estate disposers, after they sell real estate, create measurement 
error that diminishes the sensitivity to real estate prices, and that (2) real estate purchasers, after 
they acquire real estate, have a significant sensitivity to real estate prices.14 
We perform two additional tests to deal with measurement error in the value of real 
estate. Specifically, we assess the sensitivity of our findings using ranked values and an 
alternative winsorization procedure. Following Chaney et al. [2012], in our main specification 
we measure RE_VALUE as a continuous variable, but winsorize all variables at the 5% and 95%. 
As additional analyses we convert RE_VALUE to deciles as well as use it continuously but 
winsorize variables at the 1% and 99%. The results for all these tests are presented in Columns 5 
and 6 of Table 7 Panel A. In general our findings are similar to those reported in Tables 2 
through 4 shown in Column 1. The only exception is that the investment regression yields 
weaker results when using ranked RE_VALUE or when winsorizing the data at the 1% and 99%, 
suggesting that measurement error is indeed an issue in this model (the results with financing and 
reporting quality are robust to these tests).  
Finally, we examine alternative measures of our dependent variables and our reporting 
quality index. First, our measures of investment and financing exclude operating leases (which 
are excluded from financial statements under U.S. accounting rules). It is possible, however, that 
when faced with a reduction in collateralizable assets, firms might switch away from on-balance-
sheet to off-balance-sheet investment and financing. Following Beatty et al. [2010], we estimate 
                                                 
14 As additional analysis, we calculate the cumulative amount of acquisitions plus capital expenditures net of asset 
disposals since 1993 for a given firm in a given year. We then re-estimate our regressions after deleting firms in the 
largest quintile (top 20%) of this measure i.e., firms more likely to have large changes in the composition of their 
real estate assets. We find that our inferences remain with this sub-sample. 
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the asset/liability associated with operating leases15, and add the change in asset/liability 
associated with operating leases to our measure of investment and financing. Second, we 
measure our dependent variables (investment, financing and reporting quality) in year t+1 
(instead of year t) because it is possible that firms might take some time to react to the changes in 
real estate assets. Last, in the construction of FRQ_INDEX1 in our tests above, we require that 
only two of the individual proxies be available in order to maximize sample size. To test the 
sensitivity of this assumption, we re-estimate our models for the sub-sample of firms with data 
for all the individual FRQ proxies.  
The results for all these tests are presented in Columns 7 to 9 of Table 7 Panel A. Again, 
in general our findings are similar to those reported in Tables 2 through 4 shown in Column 1. 
An exception is that our results with investment also become slightly weaker when investment is 
measured in year t+1 suggesting that investment actions manifest in the same year of the changes 
in collateral values. The results with financing, however, become stronger when the dependent 
variable is moved to year t+1. One possible interpretation of this result is that financing activities 
are more lumpy (i.e., have higher adjustment costs) and take more time for firms to adjust their 
financing activities subsequent to changes in financing capacity.16  
4.5.4  Type of news 
Another concern is that our results may be capturing a “bad news” effect. In particular, 
years in which real estate values decline may be eventful (e.g., greater possibility of 
                                                 
15 Following Beatty et al. [2010], we estimate the total operating lease asset/liability by dividing the next-year 
operating leasing payment (Compustat item MRC1) by 0.10. This assumes an interest rate of 10% and that the 
payment has an infinite horizon. Beatty et al. show that this approach results in similar inferences as alternative, 
more complex methodologies. 
16 We also use the change in a firm’s market value as a dependent variable and estimate a model similar to Eq. (5). 
The idea is that changes in collateral value would affect the market value of the firms, especially financially 
constrained firms because such changes alleviate financing constraints. Consistent with our hypothesis we find that 
this is indeed the case (i.e., the coefficient on RE_VALUE is positive and significant). More importantly, we find that 
this sensitivity is smaller for firms with higher reporting quality. 
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restructuring) and, hence, associated with higher levels of reporting quality and transparency in 
general. To address this issue, we partition our sample into firm-years in which the yearly change 
in the real estate index was above 4%, which is the median change in our sample. We then re-
estimate our regressions separately for years with above (below) the median change in the state 
price index – our proxy for good (bad) news.17 In addition, we re-estimate our models after 
excluding the period of the financial crisis (years 2008 and 2009). This mitigates a concern that 
our results could be capturing other factors beyond variations in real estate prices (e.g., supply of 
lending). Finally, we examine the effect of large changes in real estate values. Firms are less 
likely to change their investment, financing and reporting activities in response to small 
variations in financing capacity. To test this argument, we keep only firms in the top and bottom 
tercile of yearly changes in state real estate price index (i.e., drop firm years in the middle 
tercile). The results of these tests are presented in Table 7 Panel B (first for investment, then for 
total financing, and finally for reporting quality as the dependent variable). With the exception of 
an insignificant coefficient on the interaction for positive news firm, the results are very similar 
to those reported in Tables 2 through 4 suggesting our findings are not specific to a particular 
type of news. 
5.  Conclusions 
Whether and how reporting quality affects financing and investment is an area that has 
seen a great deal of recent academic study. We contribute to this literature by identifying an 
exogenous change in the financing capacity of a firm to study a mechanism linking reporting 
quality to investment and financing. Specifically, we use the effect of state-level variation in real 
estate prices on the value of a firm’s real estate holdings as a proxy for changes in collateral 
                                                 
17 We also estimate our disclosure models after controlling for additional performance measures such as 
contemporaneous ROA, sales growth, and stock returns. The results are virtually identical to the findings in Table 4. 
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values and hence to the firm’s financing capacity. We then examine the relation between 
reporting quality and financing and investment conditional on this change in financing capacity. 
We also examine the firm’s changes in reporting choices in response to changes in its collateral 
values. 
Our analyses build on the approach in Chaney et al. [2012] who estimate the sensitivity 
of capital investment to exogenous changes in collateral prices and find that, over the 1993-2007 
period, a positive change in U.S. real estate values that causes an increase of collateral value 
results in additional investments. However, after conditioning on financing reporting quality, we 
find that firms with higher reporting quality have a lower sensitivity of investment to changes in 
collateral. For example, the firm’s sensitivity of investment to real estate prices in our sample is 
28% lower for firms with higher reporting quality. The results with financing show that firms 
with higher reporting quality also have a lower sensitivity of financing to collateral changes. 
We then look at whether and how firms respond to the change in their collateral values by 
changing their reporting practices. We find evidence consistent with our hypothesis that firms 
increase reporting quality subsequent to decreases in the values of their real estate assets. 
Specifically, the length of the MD&A, the filing of 8Ks and the issuance of management 
forecasts increase, and the information asymmetry component of the spread decreases in the year 
subsequent to the decrease in collateral values. Overall this suggests that firms increase reporting 
quality in response to a decrease in financing capacity. 
Our study contributes to the literature that examines the relation between reporting 
quality and investment by better identifying the relation between these variables. We provide 
evidence consistent with reporting quality mitigating the adverse section problems that give rise 
to under-investment. In addition, we show that firms change their reporting practices in response 
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to a change in collateral values. This result contributes to the literature on the association 
between disclosure and external financing by providing a specific mechanism (financing 
capacity) that drives reporting choices.  
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Appendix A: Sample Calculations for  
International Business Machines (IBM) 
(millions of dollars) 
 
Step 1: Obtain Age and Purchase Year of Real Estate 
 
Fiscal Year 1993 data: 
Property, Plant, and Equipment for Buildings at Cost  = $13,314 
Accumulated Depreciation for Buildings =  $6,553 
Proportion of Buildings Used  =  $6,553 / $13,314 = 0.492  
Age = 40 * Proportion Used = 19.68 
Purchase_year = 1993 – age = 1974 
 
Step 2: Estimate Book Value of Real Estate 
 
Book Value of Real Estate = Buildings at Cost + Construction in Progress at Cost + Land and 
Improvements at Cost = $14,736 
 
Step 3: Estimate Market Value of Real Estate as of 1993 
 
Market Value of Real Estate as of 1993  
= RE_total * (HPI_1993/HPI_1975) * (CPI_1975/HPI_purchase_yr) 
  = RE_total * (HPI_1993/HPI_1975) * (CPI_1975/HPI_1974) 
  = $58,291 
 
Step 4: Estimate Impact of Real Estate Changes on Market Value of Real Estate from 1993 to 2009 
 
Year RE_VALUE_1993 State Index Mkt_RE_VALUE 
1993 58,291 1.00 58,291 
1994 58,291 0.98 57,082 
1995 58,291 0.97 56,687 
1996 58,291 0.99 57,793 
1997 58,291 1.00 58,434 
1998 58,291 1.05 61,451 
1999 58,291 1.11 64,953 
2000 58,291 1.22 70,855 
2001 58,291 1.33 77,659 
2002 58,291 1.47 85,883 
2003 58,291 1.63 94,735 
2004 58,291 1.84 107,061 
2005 58,291 2.08 121,107 
2006 58,291 2.23 130,004 
2007 58,291 2.26 131,884 
2008 58,291 2.22 129,462 
2009 58,291 2.15 125,218 
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics and correlation matrices for the variables used in this study. INV is capital 
expenditures scaled by the lagged book value of assets expressed in percentage points. DEBT_NET is net debt 
issuances in a given year scaled by the lagged book value of assets. EQUITY_NET is net equity financing (issuances 
minus repurchases minus common dividends) in a given year scaled by the lagged book value of assets. FIN_NET is 
the ratio of the sum of net debt issuances plus net equity issuances in a given year to the lagged book value of assets. 
STATE_INDEX93,t measures the growth in real estate prices in that state from 1993 until that year. STATE_INDEXt-1,t 
measures the growth in real estate prices in that state from the previous year. RE_VALUE is the market value of the 
firm's real estate assets as of year t scaled by the lagged book value of assets. IAC_SPREAD is the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread estimated following Madhavan et al. [1997] (in percentage points). TLR_BASU is 
the timely loss recognition estimated following Wittenberg-Moerman [2008] using industry-level estimation of TLR 
using the Basu methodology. MDA_LENGTH is the number of words (in ‘000s) in the MD&A section of the 10-K 
statement. COUNT_8K is the number of 8K forms filed by the firm in a year. MGMT_FCST is the number of 
management earnings forecasts in a year. FRQ_INDEX1 is the average of standardized values of IAC_SPREAD, 
TLR_BASU, MDA_LENGTH, COUNT_8K and MGMT_FCST. FRQ_INDEX2 is the average of standardized values 
of IAC_ SPREAD, MDA_LENGTH, COUNT_8K and MGMT_FCST. CASH_FLOW is the cash flow from operations 
scaled by the lagged book value of assets. Q is the market value of assets divided by their book value. MVE is the 
market value of equity in a given year. AGE is the number of years a firm has a record in Compustat. LEVERAGE is 
the sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by the book value of assets.  ROA is operating income before 
depreciation and amortization divided by lagged total assets.  
 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std P25 P75 N 
       
INVt (%) 6.54 4.69 5.96 2.38 8.65 25,797 
DEBT_NETt 1.41 0.00 8.48 -2.34 2.35 25,797 
EQUITY_NETt 2.57 0.03 10.90 -0.20 1.00 25,797 
FIN_NETt 4.98 0.00 17.25 -3.31 5.58 25,797 
       
STATE_INDEX93,t 1.41 1.24 0.46 1.05 1.65 25,797 
STATE_INDEXt-1,t 1.04 1.04 0.06 1.02 1.07 25,797 
RE_VALUEt 0.27 0.12 0.38 0.00 0.39 25,797 
       
IAC_SPREAD t-1 (%) -0.23 -0.11 0.32 -0.28 -0.04 21,304 
TLR_BASU t-1 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.19 18,156 
MDA_LENGTH t-1 5.43 4.56 4.03 2.51 7.88 13,579 
COUNT_8K t-1 6.92 5.00 6.56 2.00 10.00 12,570 
MGMT_FCST t-1 1.33 0.00 2.70 0.00 1.00 15,528 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1 -0.03 -0.11 0.60 -0.47 0.33 21,749 
FRQ_INDEX2t -0.04 -0.16 0.65 -0.54 0.35 18,316 
       
CASH FLOWt 0.13 0.26 1.23 0.03 0.55 25,797 
Qt-1 1.93 1.47 1.27 1.08 2.28 25,797 
MVEt-1 1119 130 2795 28 722 25,797 
AGEt-1 20.06 16.00 14.08 9.00 29.00 25,797 
LEVERAGEt-1 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.36 25,797 
ROAt-1 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.01 0.13 18,316 
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Table 1: (Cont’d.) 
 
Panel B – Correlation Matrix 
 
INV FIN DEBT EQUITY INDEX RE_VALUE SPREAD TLR MDA 8K FCST 
FIN_NETt 0.25 1.00 
DEBT_NETt 0.27 0.58 1.00 
EQUITY_NETt 0.13 0.76 0.01 1.00 
STATE_INDEX93,t -0.21 -0.13 -0.06 -0.15 1.00 
RE_VALUEt 0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.13 0.05 1.00 
IAC_SPREAD t-1 0.13 -0.06 0.06 -0.11 -0.01 0.03 1.00 
TLR_BASU t-1 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01 1.00 
MDA_LENGTH t-1 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 0.41 -0.02 0.15 0.04 1.00 
COUNT_8K t-1 -0.09 -0.11 -0.04 -0.13 0.53 0.03 0.13 0.01 0.40 1.00 
MGMT_FCST t-1 -0.03 -0.12 -0.02 -0.15 0.32 -0.03 0.33 0.04 0.24 0.27 1.00 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 0.33 0.01 0.64 0.51 0.65 0.66 0.67 
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Table 2 - Role of Reporting Quality on the Effect of Collateral Shocks on Investment 
 
This table examines the role of information quality in the effect of collateral shocks on investment. The dependent variable is INV, the ratio of capital 
expenditures to the past year's assets expressed in percentage points. FRQ represents the reporting quality measures that we employ in the specification and is 
mentioned in the header of the column. All other variables are defined in Table 1. We also include year indicator variables (not tabulated). All variables, except 
the FRQ proxies, are de-meaned at the firm level so that the model is equivalent to a model with firm fixed-effects. To facilitate interpretation, the FRQ proxies 
are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Standard errors are clustered at the state and year level. t-statistics are presented beneath 
the coefficients within parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance (two-sided) at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Expected  FRQ t-1 Proxy 
VARIABLES Sign  IAC_SPREAD TLR_BASU MDA_LENGTH COUNT_8K MGMT_FCST FRQ_INDEX1
RE_VALUEt + 2.15*** 2.75*** 2.27*** 2.29*** 2.19*** 2.35*** 2.20*** 
  (5.37) (7.13) (4.42) (6.38) (8.19) (5.70) (5.54) 
STATE_INDEX93,t ? -0.09 -0.25 -0.04 -0.51* -0.08 -0.26 -0.11 
  (-0.26) (-0.76) (-0.08) (-1.87) (-0.31) (-0.97) (-0.33) 
CASH FLOWt + 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.07* 0.09*** 0.08* 0.09** 
  (1.31) (1.12) (1.32) (1.85) (3.46) (1.66) (2.14) 
Qt-1 + 1.19*** 1.14*** 1.14*** 0.94*** 0.96*** 0.96*** 1.11*** 
  (12.12) (12.21) (11.94) (9.53) (9.80) (11.58) (12.39) 
LN_MVE-1 + 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.30** 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.29** 0.33*** 
  (3.90) (3.24) (2.54) (3.81) (4.94) (2.47) (3.06) 
LN_AGEt-1 - -0.99*** -1.04*** -0.89*** -0.48 0.24 -0.57 -0.75*** 
  (-3.78) (-3.68) (-2.98) (-1.01) (0.55) (-1.37) (-3.03) 
LEVERAGEt-1 - -4.34*** -5.50*** -4.27*** -4.14*** -3.59*** -5.11*** -4.68*** 
  (-10.61) (-13.83) (-9.64) (-10.09) (-11.00) (-11.46) (-10.40) 
FRQt-1 ?  0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07* -0.05** -0.01 
   (0.41) (-1.54) (-0.73) (-1.75) (-2.11) (-0.13) 
FRQt-1* RE_VALUEt H1: -  -0.35 -0.60*** -0.38* -0.36*** -0.26*** -0.62*** 
   (-1.61) (-3.02) (-1.93) (-2.68) (-3.32) (-3.12) 
         
RE_VALUE+FRQ*RE_VALUE  - 2.40 1.67 1.90 1.83 2.09 1.58 
t-stat  - 4.91 3.41 4.54 7.27 4.87 3.99 
Observations  25,797 21,304 18,156 13,579 12,570 15,528 21,749 
R-squared  0.225 0.249 0.221 0.232 0.223 0.243 0.240 
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Table 3 - Role of Reporting Quality on the Effect of Collateral Shocks on Financing 
 
This table examines the role of information quality in the effect of collateral shocks on financing. The dependent 
variables are DEBT_NET, EQUITY_NET, and FIN_NET.  DEBT_NET is net debt issuances in a given year scaled by 
the lagged book value of assets. EQUITY_NET is net equity financing (issuances minus repurchases minus common 
dividends) in a given year scaled by the lagged book value of assets. FIN_NET is the ratio of the sum of net debt 
issuances plus net equity issuances in a given year to the lagged book value of assets. All other variables are defined 
in Table 1.  We also include year indicator variables (not tabulated). All variables, except the FRQ proxies, are de-
meaned at the firm level so that the model is equivalent to a model with firm fixed-effects. To facilitate 
interpretation, the FRQ proxies are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Standard 
errors are clustered at the state and year level. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parenthesis. *, 
**, *** denote significance (two-sided) at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 Expected Dependent Variable 
VARIABLES Sign DEBT_NETt EQUITY_NETt FIN_NETt 
     
RE_VALUEt + 1.85** -0.34 2.17 
  (2.46) (-0.44) (1.46) 
STATE_INDEX93,t ? 1.41*** -1.41*** 0.19 
  (3.24) (-3.40) (0.26) 
CASH FLOWt-1 - -0.84*** -0.93*** -2.29*** 
  (-4.83) (-4.63) (-8.22) 
Qt-1 + 0.44*** 2.96*** 4.56*** 
  (5.42) (5.78) (7.90) 
LN_MVEt-1 ? 0.65*** -1.56*** -1.47** 
  (3.58) (-4.67) (-2.51) 
LN_AGEt-1 ? -0.08 -3.68*** -3.84*** 
  (-0.22) (-3.78) (-3.43) 
LEVERAGEt-1 ? -14.20*** 5.23*** -10.57*** 
  (-12.08) (5.79) (-8.96) 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1 ? 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 
  (0.09) (-0.16) (-0.41) 
FRQ_INDEXt-1* RE_VALUEt - -0.24 -1.77*** -2.48*** 
  (-0.82) (-3.94) (-2.79) 
     
RE_VALUE+FRQ*RE_VALUE  1.609 -2.110 -0.314 
t-stat  2.371 -2.468 -0.253 
Observations  21,749 21,749 21,749 
R-squared  0.093 0.137 0.132 
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Table 4 –Effect of Collateral Shocks on Disclosure 
 
This table examines the effect of collateral shocks on disclosure. The dependent variables are MDA_LENGTH, 
COUNT_8K, IAC_SPREAD, MGMT_FCST and FRQ_INDEX2. All variables are defined in Table 1. We also 
include year indicator variables (not tabulated). All variables are de-meaned at the firm level so that the model is 
equivalent to a model with firm fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state and year level. t-statistics are 
presented beneath the coefficients within parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance (two at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
 
 
  Dependent Variable 
VARIABLES Sign MDA_LENGTHt COUNT_8Kt IAC_SPREADt MGMT_FCSTt FRQ_INDEX2t
RE_VALUEt H2: - -0.83** -0.99* -0.26** -0.63*** -0.15*** 
  (-2.05) (-1.96) (-2.00) (-2.98) (-3.52) 
STATE_INDEX93,t ? 0.29 -0.19 -0.36*** 0.09 0.01 
  (1.22) (-0.70) (-2.59) (0.48) (0.24) 
ROAt-1 + -1.56*** -2.37*** 0.91*** 0.30 0.05 
  (-5.71) (-5.62) (4.92) (1.26) (1.05) 
Qt-1 + -0.13** -0.18*** 0.09*** -0.15*** 0.00 
  (-2.49) (-3.25) (3.64) (-3.44) (0.09) 
LN_MVEt-1 + 0.01 0.21* 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.07*** 
  (0.09) (1.76) (15.00) (12.35) (6.39) 
LN_AGEt-1 + 0.09 -0.47 0.12 -0.62** -0.04 
  (0.34) (-0.99) (1.01) (-2.13) (-1.34) 
LEVERAGEt-1 - 1.09*** 0.32 -0.07 0.32* 0.13*** 
  (2.69) (0.84) (-0.29) (1.88) (3.35) 
       
Observations  15,334 14,411 21,670 17,623 18,316 
R-squared  0.294 0.601 0.106 0.220 0.457 
 
 48 
 
Table 5 – Partition by Over- and Under-Investment  
 
This table examines the role of information quality on the effect of collateral shocks on INV (Columns 1 and 2) and on FIN_NET (Columns 3 and 4), and the 
effect of collateral shocks on disclosure - FRQ_INDEX2 (Columns 5 and 6), conditional on firms’ likelihood of over- or under-investing. OVER (UNDER) are 
firms in the upper (lower) tercile of a variable that proxies for the likelihood of over- (under-) investment. The variable is the average of a ranked (deciles) 
measure of cash and leverage (multiplied by minus one). All other variables are defined in Table 1. We also include year indicator variables (not tabulated). 
Control variables are not tabulated for brevity.  All variables, except FRQ_INDEX1, are de-meaned at the firm level so that the model is equivalent to a model 
with firm fixed-effects. To facilitate interpretation, FRQ_INDEX1 is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Standard errors are 
clustered at the state and year level. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance (two-sided) at 10%, 5% 
and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable 
 INV (H1) FIN_NET (H1) FRQ_INDEX2 (H2) 
VARIABLES OVER UNDER Over-Under OVER UNDER 
Over-
Under OVER UNDER 
Over-
Under 
          
RE_VALUEt -0.09 3.34*** -3.43*** -1.19 4.24** -5.43 -0.16* -0.27*** 0.11 
 (-0.09) (6.70) (-3.17) (-0.46) (2.08) (-1.65) (-1.78) (-4.60) (1.60) 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1*RE_VALUEt -0.94** -0.51**  -3.54 -1.98**     
 (-2.00) (-2.30)  (-1.48) (-2.08)     
          
RE_VALUE+FRQ*RE_VALUE -1.03 2.83 -3.86*** -4.73 2.26 -6.99*    
t-stat (-0.91) (6.61) (-3.19) (-1.39) (1.24) (-1.81)    
Observations 6,748 7,792  6,748 7,792  5,438 6,812  
R-squared 0.200 0.253  0.177 0.141  0.409 0.443  
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Table 6: Identification tests 
 
This table examines the source of identification.  Column 1, titled “Main Result”, presents the respective results shown 
in Tables 2 through 4. Column (2) presents results employing an aggregate U.S. real estate index instead of the state 
index.  Columns (3) through (5) present results where we randomize the location of the real estate, randomly sort the 
initial real estate value by year, and randomly sort the initial real estate value by firm, respectively. All other variables 
are defined in Table 1. We also include year indicator variables (not tabulated). Control variables are not tabulated for 
brevity. All variables, except FRQ_INDEX1, are de-meaned at the firm level so that the model is equivalent to a model 
with firm fixed-effects. To facilitate interpretation, FRQ_INDEX1 is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. Standard errors are clustered at the state and year level. t-statistics are presented beneath the 
coefficients within parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance (two-sided) at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Main 
Result
U.S. 
Index
Random 
State
Random 
Year 
Random 
Firm
      
Dependent variable: Investment      
RE_VALUEt 2.20*** 2.45*** 2.07*** 0.12 -0.07 
 (5.54) (4.57) (5.54) (0.63) (-1.10) 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1*RE_VALUEt -0.62*** -0.66*** -0.50*** -0.07 0.04 
 (-3.12) (-3.18) (-3.01) (-0.41) (0.30) 
Obs 21,749 20,242 21,749 21,749 21,749 
Dependent variable: Financing      
RE_VALUEt 2.17 2.25 1.91 -0.51 -0.60 
 (1.46) (1.34) (1.30) (-0.99) (-0.63) 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1*RE_VALUEt -2.48*** -2.37** -2.59*** 0.06 -0.91 
 (-2.79) (-2.46) (-3.22) (0.11) (-1.47) 
Obs 21,749 20,242 21,749 21,749 21,749 
Dependent variable: Disclosure      
RE_VALUEt -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.00 0.02 0.02 
 (-3.52) (-2.84) (-0.08) (0.81) (0.81) 
Obs 18,318 16,837 18,318 18,318 18,318 
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Table 7: Robustness Checks 
 
This table examines series of sensitivity analyses on the role of information quality in the effect of collateral shocks on INV and FIN_NET, and the effect of 
collateral shocks on disclosure - FRQ_INDEX2. Column 1, titled “Main Result” presents the respective results shown in Tables 2 through 4. The subsequent 
columns show the sensitivity test described in the header of the column.  All other variables are defined in Table 1. We also include year indicator variables (not 
tabulated). Control variables are not tabulated for brevity. All variables, except FRQ_INDEX1 in Panels A and B, are de-meaned at the firm level so that the 
model is equivalent to a model with firm fixed-effects. To facilitate interpretation, FRQ_INDEX1 is standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation 
of one. Standard errors are clustered at the state and year level. t-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parenthesis. *, **, *** denote significance 
(two-sided) at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  
Panel A – Measurement Error 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Model Main 
Result 
Own RE 
Full period 
Disposer 
post-1993 
Acquirer 
post-1993 
Ranked 
RE_Value 
1% 
Winsor. 
With 
Op. Lease 
Dependent 
Vart+1 
Full 
FRQIndex 
Dependent variable: Investment          
          
RE_VALUEt 2.20*** 2.98*** 1.56* 10.81*** 6.13*** 1.01*** 3.51*** 4.67*** 2.34*** 
 (5.54) (7.03) (1.88) (4.64) (6.52) (2.84) (6.91) (3.28) (5.57) 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1* RE_VALUEt -0.62*** -0.79*** -0.50 -2.09 -0.57 -0.36 -0.49* -2.19 -0.67*** 
 (-3.12) (-5.50) (-0.83) (-1.01) (-1.26) (-1.18) (-1.87) (-1.13) (-2.85) 
          
Obs 21,749 11,959 1,688 3,382 21,749 21,749 21,749 19,628 6,016 
          
Dependent variable: Financing          
          
RE_VALUEt 2.17 7.09*** 1.89 29.52*** 7.12** -0.18 3.48** 3.47** 2.55 
 (1.46) (5.13) (0.53) (3.01) (2.34) (-0.17) (2.47) (2.46) (1.24) 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1* RE_VALUEt -2.48*** -2.96*** -0.50 -6.84 -3.86** -2.39*** -2.36** -2.50*** -2.13 
 (-2.79) (-2.77) (-0.44) (-0.78) (-2.14) (-3.33) (-2.48) (-2.81) (-1.59) 
          
Obs 21,749 11,959 1,688 3,382 21,749 21,749 21,749 21,749 6,016 
          
Dependent variable: Disclosure          
          
RE_VALUEt -0.15*** -0.21* -0.12* -0.38* -0.31*** -0.09*** N/A -0.15*** -0.10** 
 (-3.52) (-3.77) (-1.88) (-1.70) (-3.55) (-5.12)  (-3.46) (-1.99) 
          
Obs 18,316 10,200 1,531 3,129 18,316 18,316  19,799 10,497 
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Table 7: (Cont’d.) 
 
Panel B – Types of News 
 
 Types of News 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Positive  
News 
Negative  
News 
No Financial 
Crisis 
Large 
News 
Dependent variable: Investment     
     
RE_VALUEt 2.51*** 1.73*** 2.28*** 1.85*** 
 (4.42) (3.51) (5.11) (5.66) 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1* RE_VALUEt -0.41 -0.67*** -0.66*** -0.49** 
 (-1.38) (-2.86) (-3.16) (-2.33) 
     
Obs 12,426 9,323 20,242 14,670 
     
Dependent variable: Financing     
     
RE_VALUEt 3.23* 1.17 2.38 1.01 
 (1.77) (0.76) (1.52) (0.60) 
FRQ_INDEX1t-1* RE_VALUEt -1.26** -2.89** -2.17** -2.35** 
 (-1.99) (-2.53) (-2.32) (-2.07) 
     
Obs 12,426 9,323 20,242 14,670 
     
Dependent variable: Disclosure     
     
RE_VALUEt -0.12** -0.10** -0.14*** -0.11** 
 (-1.99) (-2.57) (-2.92) (-2.50) 
     
Obs 11,245 7,073 16,837 12,351 
 
 
 
